








Tobacco Taxes and Smoking Bans 







Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°878 
 
 
Tobacco Taxes and Smoking Bans Impact
Differently on Obesity and Eating Habits∗
Davide Dragone§ Francesco Manaresi ¶ Luca Savorelli‖
April 23, 2013
Abstract
Policy interventions aimed at affecting a specific behavior may also
indirectly affect individual choices in other domains. In this paper we
study the direct effect of tobacco excise taxes and smoking bans on
smoking behavior, and the indirect effect on eating behavior and body
weight. Using very detailed clinical data on individual health, smok-
ing, and dietary habits, we show that antismoking policies are effec-
tive in reducing smoking, but their consequences on eating behavior
dramatically depend on the specific implemented policy. Increasing
excise taxes on tobacco decreases body weight and caloric intake, and
it improves the quality of eaten food. Smoking bans, instead, do not
significantly affect body weight, although they impact on the diet com-
position. Smoking bans in restaurants induce a significant rise in the
quality of food and in daily caloric intake. Conversely, smoking bans
in bars negatively affect the quality of the daily diet, as individuals
eat more fats and less fibers, and drink more alcohol and caffeine.
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1 Introduction
Smoking and obesity are major sources of public health concern as they are,
respectively, the first and the second leading cause of preventable death in
the US (Flegal et al., 2005, Mokdad et al., 2004). Government interventions
to reduce smoking and obesity have been typically justified on the basis of
the argument that smoking and obesity produce externalities (Chaloupka,
Warner, 1998, Evans et al., 1999, Gruber, 2001, Finkelstein et al., 2004)
or, in case of dynamically inconsistent preferences, internalities (Gruber and
Ko˝szegi, 2001, 2004) which the policy maker should correct. Antismoking
policies have included the introduction of tobacco excise taxes and smoking
bans, educational interventions, advertising campaigns, and the provision of
assistance and tutoring. In this paper we focus on excises and smoking bans,
which aim at discouraging smoking behavior by directly raising the cost of
smoking tobacco. The established literature shares the view that these poli-
cies are very effective in reducing tobacco consumption by smokers.1 The
suggestive evidence that, over the last thirty years, smoking prevalence has
been decreasing while obesity prevalence has been increasing, has raised the
question of whether antismoking policies have also had unintended effects
on individual behavior and, in particular, whether they have increased food
consumption and individual weight. This conjecture is consistent with the
medical evidence that nicotine intake reduces appetite and accelerates indi-
§Corresponding author : Davide Dragone, University of Bologna, Dipartimento di
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1For example, Sweanor and Martial (1994) show that in Canada a 500% increase in
excise taxes has caused a 38% drop in smoking rate in the period 1982 - 1992, and Liu et al.
(2010) find that in the US the introduction of smoking bans in working places has reduced
smoking rates by 31% during the period 1998 - 2006. Adda and Cornaglia (2006) argue
that the reduction in the number of cigarettes smoked is counter-balanced by the increase
in smoking intensity (i.e., in the cotinine content of each cigarette smoked). Their finding
has been criticised by Abrevaya and Puzzello (2012). See Adda and Cornaglia (2011) for
a response to the critique.
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vidual metabolism (Chiolero et al., 2008, Mineur et al., 2011), and with the
popular wisdom that quitters gain body weight.2
To assess the effects of tobacco excise taxes and smoking bans on eating
behaviors and body weight, we exploit the geographical and temporal vari-
ability in the implementation of US antismoking policies. Our analysis is
based on the 1999-2008 waves of the National Health And Nutrition Exami-
nation Survey (henceforth, NHANES), a cross-sectional representative survey
of the US population that combines interviews, daily food diaries, medical
examinations and blood tests, in addition to a set of motivational questions
about dieting and exercising. The level of detail of this dataset allows to
draw a reliable picture of individual eating habits and to clearly identify the
channels through which antismoking policies affect individual behavior and
health.
Our results show that rising the taxes on cigarettes has a positive effect on
all proxies of a healthy diet. The share of fats over total nutrients is reduced
and the share of fibers and carbohydrates increases. Moreover, after two years
since the increase of the excises, individuals display a lower concentration of
LDL cholesterol and triglycerides in blood. These findings are confirmed
by additional self-reported information on eating habits showing that, after
two years since the raise in excise tax, individuals are more likely to control
their weight and choose to eat less. Consistently with the recent findings of
Courtemanche (2009) and Wehby and Courtemanche (2012), we find that a
10-cent increase in tobacco excise taxes reduces average BMI by 2.5% over a
two-year horizon, an effect which our dataset allows to link to a quantitative
reduction in terms of both a lower amount of total nutrients ingested and a
lower daily caloric intake.
The effects of smoking bans are markedly different from the effects of
taxes on tobacco, and they crucially depend on the type of public place in
which the ban is enacted. In general, bans have no effect on BMI, however
they do affect the quantity and quality of food eaten. After two years since
the enactment of bans in bars, daily total nutrients intake decreases and the
2Adda and Cornaglia (2010) consider another possible unintended consequence: they
provide evidence that smoking banks in public places have induced people to smoke more
at home, which has negatively affected the health of their live-in partners (notably, their
children) via secondary smoking.
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quality of food gets worse, with a larger share of fats at the expenses of
carbohydrates and fibers. Conversely, bans in restaurants raise daily caloric
intakes and total eaten nutrients. Interestingly, bans in bars and restaurants
have opposite effects on cholesterol in blood: the former policy rises HDL
cholesterol (the ”good” cholesterol) and reduces LDL cholesterol (the ”bad”
cholesterol), while the latter increases LDL Cholesterol. This has relevant
health consequences, because a higher concentration of HDL cholesterol in
blood can induce atherosclerosis, an important risk factor for many heart
diseases. LDL cholesterol, instead, is generally found to reduce the risk of
heart attacks.
Our results confirm that, although antismoking polices were targeted to
smoking behavior, they had an additional (and possibly unintended) impact
on individual behavior and health. This may be an issue for the design of
health-related policies, as they are often discussed and carried over under the
implicit assumption that health-related behaviors are independent and that
no relevant interconnection exists among them. When considering smoking
and eating behavior, which are the two main causes of preventable death
in most industrialized countries, this assumption does not seem to hold.
Moreover, the direction of these effects can significantly vary in magnitude
and sign, depending on the specific implemented antismoking policy.
The negative correlation between obesity and smoking prevalence has mo-
tivated a number of economic papers to study the effect of increasing cigarette
taxes and prices on body weight. In line with the common wisdom and the
medical evidence that cigarettes help reducing body weight, some studies
find that a raise in cigarette prices (or excises) on average increases BMI
(Chou et al., 2004; Rashad and Grossman, 2004; Rashad et al., 2006; Baum,
2009). Other papers point to the opposite direction, finding that an increase
in cigarette prices decreases BMI (Gruber and Frakes, 2006; Courtemanche,
2009; Wehby and Courtemanche, 2012). Courtemanche (2009) shows that
this mixed evidence can be reconciled if lags for cigarette prices or taxes are
included in the analysis. When lags are considered, all methodologies lead
to the conclusion that cigarette price is negatively associated with BMI and
obesity. We improve on this literature in three directions.
First, we provide new evidence on the mechanisms that drive the negative
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effect of excise taxes on weight. These mechanisms are still under scrutiny
and the related evidence is scarce. Using self-reported answers contained
in the BRFSS dataset, Wehby and Courtemanche (2012) and Courtemanche
(2009) suggest that the negative effect of prices is driven by increased exercis-
ing and an improved attitude towards health. Since self-reported measures
are likely to be imprecise, these authors suggested that following research
should employ a broader range of data. Using clinical data from NHANES,
we show that most of the reduction in body weight is consciously pursued
by individuals through a stricter diet, and that more attention paid to the
quality of food eaten.
Second, we extend the analysis beyond BMI, including a full set of ob-
jective dietary variables. Indeed, BMI is a highly synthetic, but rather crude
measure of the body weight condition. It conveys no qualitative or quantita-
tive information on food intake and it does not allow to distinguish fat from
lean mass (Burkhauser and Cawley, 2008, Prentice and Jebb, 2001). A more
precise identification of the effect of anti-smoking policies on individual eating
behavior may allow the researcher to better understand the channels through
which smoking, eating, and body weight are related. In addition, studying
the effect on the quality of food eaten allows a more precise assessment of
the potential unintended health benefits or costs of these policies.
Third, we broaden the analysis to smoking bans in bars, restaurants,
and workplaces. These policies have been only marginally analysed by pre-
vious studies. Chou et al. (2004) include clean indoor air laws in their
regressions and find no consistent pattern (insignificant effects for bans in
restaurants and working places, and a significant positive effect on BMI only
for a residual category including places such as elevators and public trans-
port). Liu et al. (2010) study the effect of smoking bans in workplaces and
find a positive impact on BMI. However, their paper focuses on a single type
of anti-smoking policy: as we will discuss in Section 3, the introduction of
these policies have been often almost simultaneous, and thus their specific
effect can be identified only by including all of them in the same economet-
ric model. Consistently with Chou et al. (2004) we show that BMI is not
significantly affected by smoking bans. However, other relevant dimensions
of eating behavior, notably the quantity of food eaten and its quality, are in-
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deed influenced. The assessment of the qualitative and quantitative changes
in the diet composition allows for understanding the mechanisms through
which each antismoking policy affects individual behavior and health. This
may provide useful information for the policy maker which aims at choosing
the most appropriate intervention for improving population health.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses
the identification strategy that we implement to estimate the causal effect
of anti-smoking policies, while Section 3 introduces the data used for the
empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 discusses
them. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Strategy
We want to study the effect of anti-smoking policies on several proxies of the
quantity and quality of food consumed. Courtemanche (2009) argues that the
effect of tobacco excise taxes on BMI may be appreciated only in the medium-
long term. This is because changes in cigarette smoking may lag excise tax
changes, changes in food consumption may lag cigarette smoking, and finally
BMI is likely to lag food consumption, as body-mass is a stock variable that
is accumulated over time. The same reasoning applies to smoking bans. In
addition, in this case, pricing strategies by bars and restaurants may lag
the introduction of bans, and the potential peer effect produced by anti-
smoking policies may take some time to become effective. For these reasons,
we consider both one-year and two-year lags in the effective coverage of each
policy. We thus estimate the following empirical model:


















µhWorks,t−365h +Xψ + States + Montht × Yeart + States × t+ εist
(1)
where i indexes a sampled individual, s is her state of residence, and t is the
day in which she was interviewed by NHANES (t ∈ {January 1 1999, . . . ,December 31 2008}).
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DVist is one of the dependent variables discussed below. Taxs,t is the aver-
age tobacco excise tax experienced in state s during the first year before day
t, and Taxs,t−365 is the average tobacco excise tax experienced in state s dur-
ing the second year before day t. Similarly, Bars,t,Rests,t and Works,t are
the average effective strengths of bans experienced in the year before date
t in, respectively, bars, restaurants, and working places. X is a vector of
individual and household characteristics.3 We control for state-level unob-
served heterogeneity by including a state fixed effect, and for any collective
shock at the US level by including a month-times-year fixed effect.4 Finally,
we include a state-specific time trend in the regressions, to control for pos-
sible state-specific unobservable characteristics (e.g., health consciousness)
that may affect the trends of both individual health and the enactment of
anti-smoking policies.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
The main data source for our analysis is the 1999-2008 NHANES, adminis-
tered by the Center for Disease Control (CDC). The NHANES is a biannual
representative survey of the US population. Every two years, around 10,000
individuals of all ages are interviewed and physically examined. The main
advantage of NHANES with respect to other health-related surveys (such as
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System) is the rich set of informa-
tion it collects from each interviewed person.5 The NHANES interviews col-
lect demographic, socioeconomic, dietary and health-related questions, while
the examinations include anthropometric measurements and blood tests ad-
ministered by medical personnel. In addition, interviewed individuals must
complete a daily food diary, which is then combined with nutritional data
3Individual characteristics include gender of the individual, a second order polynomial
in age, education (measured with a dummy = 1 if the individual has at least some college
education), ethnicity, and the day of the week in which the interview took place. Household
controls include gender, age, squared age, and education of the household head, household
size, and household poverty as measured by the distance between household disposable
income per adult-equivalent and the poverty line.
4In principle, one could use sharper controls, such as week-times-year of day-of-
interview fixed effects. However, sample size prevents us from identifying such effects.
5Conversely, the BRFSS has a larger sample size and a panel dimension.
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to obtain very detailed information on eating habits. For each interviewed
person, we obtained restricted information on the state of residence and on
the date of interview. We use both these sources of information to attribute
the average tobacco excise tax and the average strength of the smoking bans
in bars, restaurants, and workplaces faced by individuals in the two years
before the interview (see Section 2).
We restrict our attention to the adult population (aged 21 or more) and
we use the sampling weights provided by CDC to obtain representative esti-
mates for the US population. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of all the
variables used in the main empirical analysis. We focus on a stock measure
of food consumption (BMI), and two flow measures (daily caloric intake and
daily nutritional intake). In addition, food diaries and blood analyses allow
us to study the effect of antismoking policies on measures of the quality of
the diet, such as the share of different nutrients (proteins, carbohydrates,
fibers, and fats), alcohol and caffeine consumption, and blood levels of HDL
and LDL cholesterol and triglycerides.
The negative correlation between smoking and BMI (often found in the
medical literature) can be appreciated in Table 2. Indeed, smokers are over-
represented among underweight individuals, and under-represented among
overweight and obese. Obviously, this spurious correlation cannot be used to
infer any causal relationship.
Data on tobacco excise taxes at the state level come from the Tax Burden
on Tobacco by Orzechowski and Walker (2011). The publication reports the
exact enactment date of each modification in excise taxes issued by US state
Governments.
Information on smoking bans are obtained from the American Non-smokers’
Rights Foundation (ANRF). The ANRF collects information on the enact-
ment date of each clean outdoor air law issued at the city, county, or state
level since the early 1920s. Three types of bans are observed: antismoking
bans in bars, in restaurants, and in workplaces. The strength of any law
takes a discrete value ranging from 0 (no bans) to 3 (complete ban). Sim-
ply using state-level laws would underestimate the effective strength of the
bans perceived by state population. This is because in many states there are
several local laws that are much stronger than the state law. Counties and
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cities can only impose stronger bans with respect to those provided by state
law. To take this into consideration, we tessellate each state into administra-
tive territories, that are either cities or unincorporated areas; we attribute
to each of these administrative territories the maximum strength of the ban
among those envisaged at the territory level a, county level c and state level
s. Finally, for each state and each day t of the period 1997-2008, we con-
struct three variables (Bars,t, Rests,t and Works,t), that are the weighted sum
of the strength of the antismoking bans in bars, restaurants and workplaces
attributed to each administrative territory. For example, the variable Bars,t,
which represents the average intensity of antismoking bans in bars in state s




wacs max {Baracst,Barcst,Barst} . (2)
where wacs are weights based on the territory population, obtained from the
2010 U.S. Census. Hence Bars,t, Rests,t and Works,t represent the effective
strength of the anti-smoking bans experienced by the average resident of
state s in day t in each of these public places.
Figure 1 provides visual evidence of the trend in anti-smoking policies over
the period 1999-2008. Two elements can be highlighted: first, there is general
increase in the strengthening of all policies over the period; second, there is
a considerable positive correlation between the implementation of different
smoking bans. We control for this by identifying the effect of each policy
simultaneously, by including state and time fixed effects, and by allowing for
a state-specific time trend over the period of observation.
4 Results
In this Section, we report the results of model (1) for a set of dependent
variables of eating behavior. Before doing so, and to check the consistency
of our analysis with the existing literature, we study the effects of the anti-
smoking policies under examination on the extensive and intensive margin of
smoking. For comparability of the results, we consider the effects on smok-
ing prevalence and on daily number of cigarettes smoked. The results are
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consistent with the literature. As shown in Table 3, an increase in tobacco
excise taxes reduces the share of smokers in the population both in the short
and in the medium term: a 10 cents raise in excise taxes reduces the share
of smokers by 1% after one year, and by 1.5% in the second year after the
enactment of the policy. The effect is mildly significant in the short term,
while it becomes more precisely estimated in the medium term. Similarly to
previous studies (Adda and Cornaglia, 2012), we fail to identify a significant
effect of smoking bans in workplaces on smoking prevalence, while the effect
of smoking bans in bars in the medium-term is negative, although it is only
marginally significant.
The second column of Table 3 reports the results of estimating the effect
of anti-smoking policies on the number of cigarettes smoked per day (i.e.,
the intensive margin) among the subsample of smokers. These results must
be considered with caution, because focusing on those who are still smoking
after the enactment of the policies is likely to yield a biased estimate of
the true intensive margin of reduction. A better strategy would be to focus
on those who were smokers right before the policy implementation, however
the cross-sectional nature of NHANES prevents us to perform such exercise.
With this caveat in mind, the results show that an increase in excise taxes
is correlated with a reduction in the average number of cigarettes smoked in
the state. A similar result is obtained by smoking bans in workplaces, while
smoking bans in restaurants are correlated with an increase in the number
of cigarettes smoked per day. The latter counterintuitive result may be due
to the afore-mentioned sample selection generated by the policy itself: if
it causes a reduction in smoking prevalence only among mild smokers, the
share of heavy smokers in the count of smoking prevalence will increase.
Since heavy smokers smoke a higher number of cigarettes per head, then the
average number of cigarettes will increase.
4.1 Effects on BMI and on quantity of food
We start by replicating the exercise performed by Courtemanche, and esti-
mate model (1) using log-BMI as the dependent variable. Results are pro-
vided in the first column of Table 4. Consistently with his results, changes
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in tobacco excise taxes do not have a significant effect in the short term,
while they do have a negative and significant effect after 2 years: a 10-cent
increase in excise taxes decreases BMI by 2.4 percentage points (around 0.7
index points). Conversely, smoking bans do not have any significant effect
on BMI.
A decrease in BMI (which is a stock variable) may be the result of a
sufficiently strong reduction in the daily inflow of calories.6 Our dataset
allows us to study in detail the food consumption flows, and to link them to
the possible changes in body weight. The second column of Table 4 reports
the results of regressing log-caloric intake using model (1). As expected,
a two-year lag in excise taxes has a strong and negative effect: a 10-cent
increase reduces caloric intakes by about 5.5%. Conversely, the one-year
lag coefficient is mildly significant and positive: this may signal that in the
short-term individuals substitute food consumption for smoking, while in the
longer term reducing smoking induces individual to eat less.
Although smoking bans do not affect BMI, they do impact on eating
habit. By looking at measures of flows in food consumption we find that
daily caloric intake increases after two years from the introduction of smok-
ing bans in restaurants. This points the attention toward possible adjust-
ments in individual habits (in particular, toward an increased attendance to
restaurants) and, possibly, to the pricing policies by the restaurants, which
we will discuss in the next sections.
When we look at total nutrients intake (measured in grams of food in-
gested daily), we obtain similar results for excise taxes and bans in restau-
rants. Considering smoking bans in bars, however, we observe a significant
reduction, as a unit increase in the strength of the ban reduces total grams of
food eaten by 14.26%. Hence, individuals exposed to bans in bars reduce the
amount of food eaten, while increasing the caloric content of it, and maintain
constant their daily caloric intake.7
6Or by an increase in the consumption of calories (e.g., via physical exercise), we discuss
this channel in Section 5.
7It is worth noticing that there is no clear consensus on the variable used by humans
to peg their food needs. Some authors argue it is total nutrients intake (Rolls et al.,
1998), some others consider caloric intake (Brunstrom and Rogers 2012), finally more
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4.2 Effects on the quality of food
Whether total food intake is maintained constant, increased, or decreased,
individual’s health also significantly depends on its quality (Kant 1996). We
exploit NHANES food diaries and blood analyses to obtain direct measures
of the effect of anti-smoking policies on the share of daily nutrients eaten
over total food intake, and on the concentration of HDL cholesterol, LDL
cholesterol, and triglycerides in the blood. Table 5 reports results for shares
of different nutrients. The effect of an increase in excise taxes is markedly
different in the short and in the medium run. During the first year after
the tax increase, individuals experience an overall reduction in the quality of
food eaten: the reduction in carbohydrates is accompanied by a significant
increase in proteins and in all types of fats. Over the second year, however,
the pattern is partially reversed, as the quality of food eaten is better than it
was before the tax was raised: proteins get back to the initial level, and the
share of carbohydrates increase. The share of fibers raises by 1.32% (which
is more than half a standard deviation of the variable, see Table 1). Finally,
fats are significantly reduced by 1.3% for every 10 cents increase in excise
taxes.
Table 4 shows that the reduction in total nutrient intake after two years
from the introduction of smoking bans in bars is mainly driven by a reduction
in carbohydrates, proteins, and fibers. Thus, notwithstanding the lower total
nutrient intake, some concerns on health may be raised for a worsening of the
daily balance between nutrients. The effects of the bans in restaurants and
workplaces, instead, are mainly in the first year and do not seem to last in
the medium-long term. After two years since the strengthening of smoking
bans in restaurants, only a mild reduction in the share of proteins can be
appreciated, while bans in workplaces do not have any significant effect on
the quality of food.
From blood analyses we obtain information on the concentration (mg/dL)
of lipoproteins (cholesterols and triglycerides) in blood. Estimates of the ef-
recent researches show that individuals may peg their food needs on the basis of the daily
protein intake (Weigle et al., 2005).
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fects of anti-smoking policies on these variables are reported in Table 6.
The positive effect of tobacco excise taxes on food quality is confirmed even
by blood-level data: after two years from a 10-cent increase in taxes, LDL
cholesterol drops by 4.4%, while HDL increases by 2.8%. Triglycerides con-
centration is reduced by 6%. The negative impact of smoking bans in bars,
as measured by shares of nutrients, is confirmed by blood-level analyses:
after two years from the strengthening of the bans, LDL and triglycerides
increase, while the “good” cholesterol is reduced. Finally, there is evidence
of a positive effect of smoking bans in restaurants on HDL cholesterol.
5 Discussion
The results presented in the previous section allow us to show that tobacco
taxes and smoking bans can produce very different results on eating behavior
and body weight. Tobacco excise taxes induce a reduction of BMI, caloric
intake and total nutrients. The reduction in the quantity of food is accompa-
nied by an improvement in the quality of the diet, with a higher proportion of
fibers and carbohydrates, and a lower proportion of fats. This improvement
can be appreciated even from blood-analyses, which show a drop in LDL
cholesterol and triglycerides and an increase in the concentration of HDL
cholesterol.
Smoking bans in bars, instead, do not have a direct effect on BMI, but they
slightly reduce the daily grams of nutrients intake. This small reduction is
counterbalanced by the worse quality of the food, as the share of fats in-
creases, and the concentration of LDL and triglycerides rises.
Finally, bans in restaurants induce individuals to eat larger amounts of food,
both in terms of caloric intake and in terms of total nutrients. The com-
position of the diet is not significantly affected by this increase, with some
evidence that HDL concentration rises. Bans in workplaces affect neither the
quantity nor the quality of food eaten.
Which are the channels through which taxes and smoking bans affect food
consumption? Although both policy interventions change the incentives to
smoking, they act through different pathways. Excises taxes raise the mon-
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etary cost of each cigarette, irrespective of the place where the cigarette is
smoked. In a static framework, we would expect the smoker to react by
reducing the number of cigarettes and to increase food consumption. This
is indeed what we observe in the first year after the increase in excises. Ad-
diction to smoking, body weight, and eating habits, however, take time to
change, and the correct theoretical framework to interpret the effect of a
change in the price of cigarettes requires a dynamic framework. If increas-
ing the taxes on tobacco only affects individual incentives of a smoker, the
theoretical predictions presented by Dragone et al. (2012), who study the
long-run price effects in a dynamic model where smoking is addictive and
food consumption affects body weight, turn out to be useful.8 According to
that model, the decrease in smoking, food consumption and body weight we
reported after an increase in the price of smoking signals that smoking rein-
forces food consumption. When reinforcement is strong enough, a reduction
in smoking due to an increase in the price of tobacco leads to a reduction in
the total amount of food intake and in body weight. In other words, food
and smoking are complements, so that the introduction of excise taxes on
tobacco allows to address two different, but related targets such as the reduc-
tion in food consumption and body weight by using just a single policy tool.
Given that discussing, designing and implementing a public policy aimed at
improving health-related behavior is costly, this is clearly good news for the
policy maker and for the tax-payer.
When considering the effect of bans on eating behavior, the picture be-
comes more complicated because bans do not affect the cost of each smoked
cigarettes, but they are binding only in specific places and occasions. This
may reduce the effectiveness of a ban in discouraging smoking behavior and
the consequent effects on eating behavior, because the smoker can avoid the
places where smoking is banned. The casual evidence of smokers gathering
outside of restaurants or pubs where a smoking ban is enforced suggests an
interesting effect produced by antismoking bans, where the ”smoking break”
becomes the occasion to socialize and chat with other smokers. If smokers
8It is clearly questionable whether our empirical estimates over a two-years horizon
can be reasonably compared with theoretical predictions over an infinite time-horizon
contained in Dragone et al. (2012). For our purposes, however, these predictions are
useful to show a possible rationale for the observed empirical results.
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enjoy these occasions, the ban produces a benefit from smoking, an effect
which goes in the opposite direction with respect to the intentions of the pol-
icy maker. Hence, it is not obvious to expect a smoking ban to unambigu-
ously discourage smoking, which may explain why the empirical literature
has often reported small or nil effects of this kind of policy interventions. An
additional, but very relevant feature of smoking bans is that they directly
address one of the main concerns of the policy makers: the fact that smok-
ers create an externality on non-smokers. By creating non smoking areas, a
ban changes the way in which both smokers and non-smokers enjoy public
places. In this direction, we can provide evidence that smoking bans in bars
and restaurants induce people to go more often in these public places. Table
8 provides results of the effect of anti-smoking policies on two goods that
are largely consumed in US bars (caffeine and alcohol) and on the number
of times that the individuals report to go to restaurants over a typical week.
As it can be seen, after two years bans in bars induce a significant rise in
both caffeine and alcohol consumption,9 while the introduction of a ban in
restaurants increases the number of times that individuals eat out of home.
This higher attendance may be explained by two reasons: it may be that a
smoke-free restaurant or bar is perceived as an amenity by customers (either
smokers, or non-smokers, or both); or it may be that in the long-run bars
and restaurants have changed their pricing policies to counteract the poten-
tial loss of smoker customers. Although with our data we are not able to
disentangle these two effects, the fact that smoking bans in restaurants and
pubs have induced an increased demand for goods sold in restaurants and
pubs deserves careful consideration by the policy maker. On one hand, al-
though customers go more often to bars and restaurant after two years since
the enactment of the bans, we record no increase in BMI. If one disposed of
no additional information on dietary choices and on the medical condition of
people, it would be tempting to conclude that bans are ineffective on chang-
ing eating behavior. This would be misleading, however, because we can see
that smoking bans do impact on individual eating behavior, although the
effects go in different directions. Customers of restaurants eat more healthy
9The same association is observed if we look at the concentration of alcohol and caffeine
in blood.
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food, while customers of pubs eat slightly less than before the enactment of
the ban, but the quality is worse.
One may wonder whether these changes in eating habits and weight are
intentional or not. The NHANES contains information on interviews where
people where asked to report their weight at the time of the interview and
one year before it.10 This yields a subjective measure of perceived weight
change over the year. If this weight change is larger than 10 pounds in
absolute value, the person was also asked to report whether this change
was intentional or not, and whether this goal was achieved by being on a
diet and/or by exercising. The first column of Table 7 reports the results
obtained by regressing the log-difference weight change during the year before
the interview on anti-smoking policies. It is reassuring to observe that the
estimate of the long-term effect of a tax increase is negative, as it was using
objective measures of weight loss.
The second column of Table 7 provides the estimates of a linear prob-
ability model in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if
individuals have tried to intentionally lose weight. In the short term tobacco
excise taxes reduce the intention to lose weight, while this intention increases
over the longer term. Finally, in the last two columns we report the results of
linear probability models in which the dependent variables take value 1 if the
individual decided to reduce weight by being on diet or by exercising (the two
answers are not mutually exclusive). The results show that the intentional
weight loss due to an increase in taxes was obtained through dieting, and
that the perceived weight gain that followed a strengthening of bans in bars
induced individuals to exercise and to follow a stricter diet.11
10This subjective measure of weight was not used to calculate BMI, which we instead
calculated from the objective measurements of weight and height performed by the CDC
personnel.
11Interestingly people report having increased their body weight, a result that is not
consistent with the objective measures based on BMI. The perceived increase in weight
reported after two years since bans in bars were strengthened does not seem to be inten-
tional, while smoking bans in restaurants reduce the willingness to lose weight.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we have provided new evidence on the effect of anti-smoking
policies on food consumption. Our analysis extends the literature in two
main directions. First, we consider the effect of antismoking policies on both
stock variables, such as BMI, and on flow variables related to the quality and
quantity of food. Second, we consider and compare a variety of antismoking
policies such as excise taxes on tobacco and smoking bans in bars, restaurants
and working places. This allows to disentangle the differential effect of each
policy on individual body weight, and to precisely link these effects to changes
in individual eating behavior and health.
We find that, after two years since their enactment, excise taxes reduce
BMI and the quantity of consumed food. At the same time, the quality of
the diet improves, with less fats, more carbohydrates, and fibers. This im-
provement can be appreciated even from blood analyses, where a reduction
in LDL cholesterol and triglycerides and an increase in HDL cholesterol are
observed. There is strong evidence that changes in eating habits are inten-
tionally pursued by individuals.
Smoking bans have different effects on quantity and quality of food eaten:
after bans in bars are introduced the quality of food becomes worse; as an ef-
fect of bans in restaurants, instead, the quantity of food consumed increases,
although the quality slightly increases. We provide evidence suggesting that
these effects may be driven by individuals going more often to bars and
restaurants as a result of the strengthening of smoke-free laws. In particular,
smoking bans in bars and restaurants would favour eating and drinking out.
This increase in attendance of bars and restaurants may be explained by two
non-competing reasons: first, it may be that a smoke-free public place has
a higher perceived amenity value for individuals (including non-smokers);
second, bars and restaurants may reduce their prices as a response to the
smoking bans and to avoid losing customers. To gauge the role of these two
different reasons, additional information on pricing policies implemented by
bars and restaurants is needed. In addition, it would be interesting to identify
whether this effect is relevant for smokers and non-smokers alike. However,
the cross-sectional structure of the NHANES prevents us to distinguish the
16
impact of the policies by smoking status.
While our results are in line with those authors suggesting that policy-
makers should not fear anti-smoking policies to increase BMI (e.g. Courte-
manche, 2009; Wehby and Courtemanche, 2012), we suggest that we should
still be cautionary in assessing the impact of antismoking policies on eating
behaviors. Our main result is that antismoking policies substantially change
the qualitative features of a person’s diet. This association might enhance
or impair the effectiveness of other weight-related policies. Identifying the
channels and the effects of smoking on specific foods is thus still an open
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8 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Adult population, age 21 or older. Years
1999 - 2008.
Variable Mean St.Dev. No. of Obs.
Body-Mass Index 28.31 6.49 23846
Daily KCalories 2206.35 1035.19 23242




Share of Carbohydrates 0.59 0.10 23242
Share of Proteine 0.19 0.06 23242
Share of Fibers 0.04 0.02 23242
Share of Total Fats 0.18 0.06 23242
Share of Saturated Fats 0.06 0.02 23242
Share of Polyunsaturated Fats 0.06 0.02 23242
Share of Monounsaturated Fats 0.07 0.03 23242
LDL-Cholesterol (mg/dL) 118.15 35.54 8663
HDL-Cholesterol (mg/dL) 52.82 16.01 18731
Triglycerides (mg/dL) 153.74 125.49 16159
Male 0.48 0.50 27048
Age 46.14 15.89 23444
College Education or Higher 0.55 0.50 27048
Mexican 0.33 0.47 27048
Black 0.11 0.31 27048
Other Ethnicities 0.11 0.31 27048
HH Size 3.01 1.53 27048
HH Head Male 0.59 0.49 27043
HH Head Age 48.14 16.40 27043
Ratio of Family Income to Poverty 3.02 1.62 24572
Table 2: Weight classes and shares of smokers, weighted results.Adult popu-
lation, age 21 or older. Years 1999 - 2008.
Weight class Obese Overweight Normal Underweight
Smoking prevalence (%) 20.6 22.0 28.7 42.1
Weight class share (%) 32.3 34.3 31.6 1.8
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Table 3: Effect of anti-smoking policies on smoking prevalence and number
of cigarettes smoked (conditional on being a smoker). Years 1999-2008.
Pr(Smoking) No. of Cigarettes
per Day
Excise Tax (unit USD) - year 1 -0.101 -0.0535
(0.060)* (0.0250)**
Excise Tax (unit USD) - year 2 -0.1541 -0.0111
(0.09401)* (0.0444)
Excise Tax Squared - year 1 0.05 0.20
(0.025)** (0.10)*
Excise Tax Squared - year 2 0.07 0.00
(0.040) (0.20)
Bans in Bars - Year 1 0.0149 0.4497
(0.0183) (0.5849)
Bans in Bars - Year 2 - 0.0334 0.6434
(0.0175) * (0.7947)
Bans in Restaurants - Year 1 -0.0533 -3.342
(0.0527) (2.0294)
Bans in Restaurants - Year 2 0.0503 4.7305
(0.0441) (1.8643)**
Bans in Working Places - Year 1 0.0460 3.6046
(0.0522) (2.1087)
Bans in Working Places - Year 2 -0.0309 -5.0576
(0.0488) (2.1134)**
Controls Y Y
State FE Y Y
Time FE Y Y
State-spec. trend Y Y
Obs. 20678 7985
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls include gender, age, education, and
ethnicity of the interviewed person; household size, household income (measured as the distance from
the poverty line), household head gender and age, and a set of day of the week dummies. *** indicates
statistically significant at 1% level; ** at 5% level; * at 10% level.
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Table 4: Effect of anti-smoking policies on (log) BMI, (log) daily KCal, (log)
daily total nutrients. Years 1999-2008.
log-BMI log-KCal log-Total Nutrients
Excise Tax (unit USD) - year 1 -0.0786 0.305 0.1771
(0.1308) (0.1764)* (0.1630)
Excise Tax (unit USD) - year 2 -0.2542 -0.590 -0.5434
(0.07933)*** (0.1288)*** (0.1360)***
Excise Tax Squared - year 1 -0.00 -0.10 -0.04
(0.052) (0.067) (0.10)
Excise Tax Squared - year 2 0.130 0.40 0.340
(0.040)*** (0.40)*** (0.10)***
Bans in Bars - Year 1 0.0306 -0.0003 0.0225
(0.0284) (0.03775) (0.0348)
Bans in Bars - Year 2 0.0546 0.03775 -0.1426
(0.03628) (0.03736) (0.0389)***
Bans in Restaurants - Year 1 -0.1028 0.0853 0.0733
(0.0949) (0.1070) (0.1270)
Bans in Restaurants - Year 2 0.0449 0.4761 0.5831
(0.2340) (0.2000)** (0.2172)**
Bans in Working Places - Year 1 0.1751 -0.1842 -0.1898
(0.1058) (0.1059) (0.1312)
Bans in Working Places - Year 2 -0.0864 -0.3618 -0.4286
(0.2628) (0.2151) (0.2421)*
Controls Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y
State-spec. trend Y Y Y
Obs. 16886 16359 16359
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls include gender, age, education, and
ethnicity of the interviewed person; household size, household income (measured as the distance from
the poverty line), household head gender and age, and a set of day of the week dummies.*** indicates
statistically significant at 1% level; ** at 5% level; * at 10% level.
22
Table 5: Effect of anti-smoking policies on (log) shares of nutrients. Years
1999-2008.
Shares of Nutrients
Carbohydrates Proteins Fibers Fats Saturated Polyunsat. Monounsat.
Excise Tax (unit USD) - Year 1 -0.1760 0.0622 0.0086 0.1052 0.0369 0.0230 0.0453
(0.0399)*** (0.0261)** (0.0076) (0.0225)*** (0.0101)*** (0.0070)*** (0.0115)***
Excise Tax (unit USD) - Year 2 0.1308 -0.0153 0.0137 -0.1293 -0.0413 -0.0321 -0.0558
(0.0427)*** (0.0318) (0.0074)* (0.0190)*** (0.0076)*** (0.0058)** (0.0091)***
Excise Tax Squared - Year 1 0.0500 -0.0002 0.0010 -0.0340 -0.0110 -0.0090 -0.0150
(0.0200)*** (0.0001) (0.0030) (0.0100)*** (-0.0050)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0050)***
Excise Tax Squared - Year 2 -5.7000 0.0001 -0.0050 0.0056 0.0170 0.0140 0.0250
(0.0200)*** (0.0001) (0.0040) (0.0100)*** (0.0044)*** (0.0038)*** (0.0060)***
Bans in Bars - Year 1 -0.0006 -0.0023 0.0004 0.0024 0.0004 0.1076 0.0965
(0.0099) (0.0055) (0.0012) (0.0050) (0.0024) (0.2031) (0.2451)
Bans in Bars - Year 2 -0.0307 0.0119 -0.0058 0.0246 0.0095 0.7155 0.7909
(0.0525)*** (0.0080) (0.0010)*** (0.0054)*** (0.0027)*** (0.2001)*** (0.2398)***
Bans in Restaurants - Year 1 -0.0593 0.0469 0.0093 0.0031 0.0042 -0.0028 0.0017
(0.0299)* (0.0179)*** (0.0049)* (0.0158) (0.0048) (0.0073) (0.0071)
Bans in Restaurants - Year 2 0.0601 -0.0556 -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0028 0.0000 0.0005
(0.0479) (0.0286)** (0.0091) (0.0290) (0.0115) (0.0150) (0.0130)
Bans in Working Places - Year 1 0.0493 -0.0378 -0.0155 0.0040 -0.0026 0.0058 0.0008
(0.0318) (0.0194)** (0.0051)* (0.0171)* (0.0048) (0.0080) (0.0078)
Bans in Working Places - Year 2 -0.0362 0.0403 0.0096 -0.0138 0.0001 -0.007 -0.006
(0.0525) (0.0308) (0.0103) (0.0328) (0.0117) (0.01681) (0.0145)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State-spec. trend Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 16359 16359 16359 16359 16359 16359 16359
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls include gender, age, education, and
ethnicity of the interviewed person; household size, household income (measured as the distance from
the poverty line), household head gender and age, and a set of day of the week dummies.*** indicates
statistically significant at 1% level; ** at 5% level; * at 10% level.
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Table 6: Effect of anti-smoking policies on (log) LDL, (log) HDL cholesterol,
(log) triglycerids. Years 1999-2008.
Cholesterol Triglycerides
LDL (”bad”) HDL (”good”)
Excise Tax (unit USD) - Year 1 0.1690 0.0237 -0.0730
(0.2012) (0.0939) (0.1475)
Excise Tax (unit USD) - Year 2 -0.4520 0.2967 -0.6190
(0.1553)*** (0.1379)** (0.3653)*
Excise Tax Squared - Year 1 -0.1000 -0.0500 0.1000
(0.0780)* (0.0400) (0.0710)**
Excise Tax Squared - Year 2 0.1000 -0.1800 0.6000
(0.1140) (0.0800)** (0.2140)***
Bans in Bars - Year 1 -0.0081 0.0866 -0.2197
(0.0388) (0.0247)*** (0.0737)***
Bans in Bars - Year 2 0.1089 -0.0695 0.1408
(0.0400)*** (0.0315)** (0.0770)*
Bans in Restaurants - Year 1 0.4389 -0.1419 0.1143
(0.1304)*** (0.0922) (0.1862)
Bans in Restaurants - Year 2 -0.1088 0.3709 -0.2858
(0.2462) (0.1693)** (0.3475)
Bans in Working Places - Year 1 -0.2059 0.0755 -0.1307
(0.1446) (0.1043) (0.2062)
Bans in Working Places - Year 2 -0.1726 -0.3251 0.2720
(0.2813) (0.1941) (0.3798)
Obs. 16359 16359 16359
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls include gender, age, education, and
ethnicity of the interviewed person; household size, household income (measured as the distance from
the poverty line), household head gender and age, and a set of day of the week dummies. *** indicates
statistically significant at 1% level; ** at 5% level; * at 10% level.
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Table 7: Effect of anti-smoking policies on (log) reduction in weight and (log)
probability of having an intentional weight change (conditional on weight
loss), number of times at the restaurant per week (non-log), decision to
control weight, and two methods of weight control: exercising (exercised),
reducing the amount of consumed calories (lower cal). Years 1999-2008.
Weight Loss Intentional Exercise Diet
Excise Tax (unit USD) - Year 1 2.5130 -1.4930 0.3960 0.3280
(1.9186) (0.0028)*** (0.1560)** (0.1530)**
Excise Tax (unit USD) - Year 2 -4.1660 1.4870 0.3050 0.2270
(1.8700)** (0.4078)*** (0.1970) (0.1150)**
Excise Tax Squared - Year 1 -0.7000 0.4000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.6500) (0.1150)*** (0.1000) (0.1000)
Excise Tax Squared - Year 2 1.8000 -0.5000 -0.1000 -0.0000
(1.26) (0.2110) (0.1000) (0.1000)
Bans in Bars - Year 1 -0.2705 -0.2407 -0.1196 -0.9500
(0.4726) (0.0744)*** (0.0420)*** (3.181)
Bans in Bars - Year 2 1.5949 0.1767 0.2880 6.7500
(0.4893)** (0.0911) (0.0392)*** (3.4490)**
Bans in Restaurants - Year 1 0.4389 -0.3002 0.3909 5.0900
(1.5169) (0.2429) (0.1388)*** (10.9470)
Bans in Restaurants - Year 2 -4.3228 -1.0590 -0.3088 -12.0100
(3.0729) (0.3553)*** (0.2921) (21.3600)
Bans in Working Places - Year 1 -1.5600 0.5465 -0.2646 -11.3600
(1.7030) (0.2425)** (0.1550)* (12.7410)
Bans in Working Places - Year 2 2.2469 0.9250 -0.0282 13.4600
(3.412) (0.3466)** (0.3119) (23.3860)
Obs. 16359 16359 17155 17155
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls include gender, age, education, and
ethnicity of the interviewed person; household size, household income (measured as the distance from
the poverty line), household head gender and age, and a set of day of the week dummies.*** indicates
statistically significant at 1% level; ** at 5% level; * at 10% level.
25
Table 8: Effect of anti-smoking policies on (log) alcohol and (log) caffeine in
blood analysis. Years 1999-2008.
(log) Caffeine (log) Alcohol Rest. per week
Excise Tax (unit USD) - Year 1 -2.9849 6.8600 -21.2800
(1.5200)* (2.4652)*** (23.9900)
Excise Tax (unit USD) - Year 2 -1.4233 5.4300 -48.5600
(1.4500) (1.7650)*** (26.7800)*
Excise Tax Squared - Year 1 0.0173 -0.0200 11.0000
(0.0100) (0.0083)** (14.0000)
Excise Tax Squared - Year 2 0.0086 -0.0200 35.0000
(0.0001)** (0.0119) (21.0000)
Bans in Bars - Year 1 -0.8979 -0.4814 22.1539
(0.2035)*** (0.4305) (29.2080)
Bans in Bars - Year 2 0.6965 1.6978 -2.1811
(0.3221)** (0.5175)*** (1.0300)**
Bans in Restaurants - Year 1 0.0178 0.9325 -28.2085
(0.9022) (2.0106) (15.4556)*
Bans in Restaurants - Year 2 0.1978 0.5473 14.6050
(1.5345) (3.7087) (5.5489)***
Bans in Working Places - Year 1 0.4544 -1.4716 -45.4199
(0.9954) (2.1720) (46.1297)
Bans in Working Places - Year 2 0.1460 -0.3759 -7.4951
(1.7471) (4.2156) (5.5084)
Obs. 16359 16359 7974
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Controls include gender, age, education, and
ethnicity of the interviewed person; household size, household income (measured as the distance from
the poverty line), household head gender and age, and a set of day of the week dummies. *** indicates
statistically significant at 1% level; ** at 5% level; * at 10% level.
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